MAIB del accidente, el viejo tenía alguna copa de más, se quedó dormido y atravesó el TSS de Lands Ends como una bala hasta acabar en las piedras. El relato sacado de las grabaciones es esclarecedor, el Capitán y el primero ucranianos, el segundo filipino. Como curiosidad, años antes habían varado con otro que iba pimpado, lo que llevo a la naviera a implantar la politica de alcohol cero (con escaso éxito).
Por mucho que se escriba, regule, reglamente o innove, el problema está en los profesionales, en su preparación, incentivación y número.
Va un extracto del MAIB:
At 0022 the master returned to the bridge and turned on a music compact disc player. He sat on one of the bridge chairs in front of the radars and the second officer occupied the other chair. The two men had a general discussion, in English.
Over the course of the next 2 hours the master left the bridge at intervals but returned each time after about 10 minutes. On one occasion, as he left, he invited the second officer to follow him for a drink; this offer was declined.
During this period, the master’s speech became increasingly slurred, and on occasions he spoke in Russian, which the second officer could not understand.
At 0249 the master started to fall asleep and the second officer suggested several times that he should go and rest. However, the master gave no coherent response.
At 0312 the second officer began to cry, following which he told the master to take some rest and never to punch him again.
At 0426 Karin Schepers reached her planned alteration of course position at the entrance to the south-bound lane of the TSS. However, the vessel did not alter course and continued on a heading of 135º, at 16.6 knots, as she crossed the north-bound lane of the TSS, passing within 2 miles of a vessel in that lane at 0456
At 0525 Karin Schepers was 2 miles from land when an unidentified vessel called her on VHF radio to advise her to check her position. No response was made to this call. Alerted by this call, the coastguard at Falmouth MRCC made a number of attempts to contact Karin Schepers on VHF radio, Medium Frequency radio and satellite telephone. These calls were audible on the bridge of the vessel, but the master did not respond.
At 0534 Falmouth MRCC called out Sennen Cove Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) lifeboat and began to contact the Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopter, the St Ives cliff rescue team, and on-call senior Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) managers.
Karin Schepers began to vibrate heavily as she entered shallow water, the satellite telephone continued to ring, and numerous bridge alarms sounded as the vessel grounded at 0536.
At 0538 the master woke up and the propeller pitch was set to zero. The chief officer arrived on the bridge, asked the master what had happened, and was told “nothing”.
Aprovechando que había un dispositivo de separación, van unas lineas (sacadas del informe) sobre el papel del MRCC de Falmouth en su faceta de control de tráfico:
In 2008 the MCA submitted an application to IMO to amend the Land’s End TSS. The application stated that “vessels fitted with AIS are remotely monitored for compliance with Rule 10 of the 1972 Collision Regulations by Falmouth MRCC”. This statement does not reflect the existing role of the coastguard or the instructions issued to them in their operational procedures.
The role of the coastguard in relation to the monitoring of the AIS transmission of vessels transiting the Land’s End TSS requires clarification, as differences exist between MCA operational orders and submissions made by the UK to the IMO.