La investigación oficial de los noruegos no apunta a una única causa, sino a un cúmulo de ellas, como en casi todos los accidentes. El Bourbon Dolphin era un remolcador nuevo, que con solo dos meses dio la vuelta, en una maniobra de fondeo de anclas en el Mar del Norte.
El relato de los hechos, indica que un cambio de rumbo para evitar enredarse con una líneas de fondeo, hizo que la cadena que remolcaba se deslizase sobre el rodillo, pasando del pin interior de estribor al pin exterior de babor, esto le ocasiono una fuerte escora a babor de la que se recupero solo, pero momentos después volvió a escorar a la misma banda y ya quedo quilla al Sol.
Esa fue la causa, pero según el informe el remolcador era demasiado pequeño para andar en aquellas tareas, la naviera no había hecho ningún cálculo de las limitaciones de operación del barco, cosa que dejaba al criterio del Capitán. Capitán que había tenido justo una hora y media para familiarizarse con el barco y su tripulación.
Hubo siete supervivientes, se consiguieron recuperar los cadaveres del Capitán (44 años), Primero(37 años) y Segundo (31 años), y se dieron por desaparecidos, al hijo del Capitán (14 años), Jefe (42 años), segundo maquinista (25 años), chispas (27) y Contramaestre (52).
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The commission noted that the Bourbon Dolphin was a “relatively small and compact” vessel of a design of which Bourbon had had no previous experience.
It argued that the company should therefore have carried out “more critical assessments of the vessel’s characteristics, equipment and not least operational limitations, both during her construction and during her subsequent operations under various conditions”.
It claimed, too, that the company had failed to draw the necessary conclusions from “an unexpected stability-critical incident” which had taken place two months after it had taken delivery of the vessel.
The vessel’s “stability-related challenges” had not been communicated by its builder, Ulstein, to Bourbon or by Bourbon to those who were to operate it, it said.“The anchor-handling conditions prepared by the shipyard were not realistic,” it said. “Nor did the Norwegian Maritime Directorate’s regulatory system make any requirement that these be approved.”
The commission found that there had also been failures in the implementation of ISM code procedures.
No specific anchor-handling procedure anchor-handling procedure had been defined for the Bourbon Dolphin and the company had failed to obey the ISM’s requirement that all risks be identified.It had also failed to ensure that the crew were adequately qualified for demanding operations, it said, while the master had been given just one and a half hours to familiarise himself with the Bourbon Dolphin and its crew.